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SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF TECHNOLOGICAL A N D  
ECONOMIC DYNAMICS 
This new research project at  IIASA is concerned with modeling technological change, and 
the broader economic developments that are associated with technological change, both as cause 
and effect. The central purpose is to  develop stronger theory and better modeling techniques. 
The basic philosophy is that such theoretical and modeling work is most fruitful when attention 
is paid to  the known empirical details of the phenomena the work aims to  address. 
Over the last decade considerable progress has been made on various techniques of dynamic 
economic modeling. Some of this work has employed ordinary differential and difference equa- 
tions, and some of it stochastic equations. Several models have been developed in which an 
economic analogue of "natural selection" winnows out a population whose members have dif- 
ferent attributes and different degrees of fitness. A number of efforts have taken advantage of 
the growing power of simulation techniques. Others have employed more traditional mathemat- 
ics. As a result of this theoretical work, the toolkit for modeling technological and economic 
dynamics is significantly richer than it was a decade ago. 
During the same period, there have been major advances in the empirical understanding. 
There are now many more detailed technological histories available. Much more is known about 
the similarities and differencers of technical advance in different fields and industries and there is 
some understanding of the key variables that  lie behind those differences. A number of studies 
have provided rich information about how industry structure co-evolves with technology. In 
addition to  empirical work a t  the technology or sector level, the last decade has also seen a great 
deal of empirical research on productivity growth and measured technical advance a t  the level 
of whole economies. A considerable body of empirical research now exists on the facts that seem 
associated with different rates of productivity growth across the range of nations. 
As a result of this recent empirical work, the questions that successful theory and useful 
modeling techniques ought to address now are much more clearly defined. The theoretical work 
described above often has been undertaken in appreciation of certain stylized facts that  needed 
to  be explained, like the apparent phenomenon of dynamic increasing returns, or in other cases, 
understanding that n many industries the distribution of firm sizes is approximately log normal. 
However, the connection between the theoretical work and the empirical phenomena has so far 
not been very close. The philosophy of this project is that  the chances of developing powerful 
new theory and useful new analytical techniques can be greatly enhanced by performing the work 
in an environment where scholars who understand the empirical phenomena provide questions 
and challenges for the theorists and their work. 
The research will focus upon the following three areas: 
1. Technological and Industrial Dynamics 
2. Innovation, Competition and Macrodynamics 
3. Learning Processes and Organisational Competence. 
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ABSTRACT 
A laboratory experiment was performed as replication of the orignal one 
created by M. Cohen and P. Bacdayan at Mchigan University. It consists in a two- 
persons card game played by a large number of pairs. whose actions are stored in a 
computer's memoy. In order to acheve the final goal each player must dscover h s  
sub-goals. and must coordinate his action nlth the partner's one. The game 
therefore involves the division of knowledge and cooperation among players, and 
gives rise to the emergence of organizational routines. It is suggested that the 
organizational routines. i.e. the sequences of patterned actions which lead to the 
realization of the final goal. cannot be fully memorized because of their variety and 
number. It is shown that players do not possess all the knowledge needed by an 
h~pothetical supervisor to play the best strategy: they generally e.xplore only a 
limited part of the the space of the potential rules. and therefore learn and 
memorize a simple. bounded set of "personal" meta-rules. These meta-rules. also 
called "production rules" in standard Cognitive Science's language. are of the form 
<If "Condtion" then "Action">. Each "Condition" can concern either the game 
configurations or the partner's action. In the former case the idenufication of an 
appropriate "Action" depends on the sub-goals exploration . In the latter it depends 
on the recognition (or discovery) of interaction rules : in this eventuality the 
production rule embodies n dynamic - and possibly cooperative - reaction to the 
partner's action. Organizational procedures (routines) therefore emerge as  the 
outcome of a distributed process generated by "personal" production rules . These 
routines. as in von Hayek's view. "can be understood as if it were made according 
to a single plan. although nobod!. has planned it." (Hayek. 1980. p. 34). Empirical 
ekldence is provided to support the above statements. 
Paper prepared for tile h~teniational Ecol~on~ic Association Conference on Rationality ill Econolnics ,(ICER , 
Torino. dec. 1993) , fortl~coli~ing in Arrow et al. (editors). Rariorralin, irr Ecor~onrics , London, MacMillan 
Tl~e present paper is based on a laboraton csperin~ent \\-hich has been builded as replication of tlie original one 
created by M. Col~en and P. Bacdavari at Miclugan Universitv. The expenmelit would never be realized without the 
careful assistilnce and generous help of Michael Cohen. I am very grateful to him arid to tl~e group of researchers 
who actively cooperated at tlie organization of tlie experiment in Trento: Nicolao Bonini, Alessandro N a r d ~ o ,  
Salvatore Tmina, Paolo Patelli, Riccardo Pereim. They carefi~lly implemented all the steps of tlie experiment. and 
criticallv discussed \\iith me the prir~cipal tinhngs. Of coiuse responsibility for the present paper is e~ltirelv mine. 
I .  l~ltrod~~ctioll: proced~lraf ratio~rality , organizations/ routines arldproblem soh~i?lg. 
The idea that the learning activity plays a central role in human decision making derives 
from the pioneering work of Simon, March and Newell. In 1956, in a path-breaking 
article which constituted a first crucial step in analyzing rationality within organizations, 
Cyert, Simon and Trow carried out an empirical analysis of managerial decisions which 
revealed an evident "dualism" of behaviour: on the one hand, a coherent choice among 
alternatives; on the other, a search for the knowledge required to make the choice. For 
several months, an observer monitored the decisions made by the executives in a 
particular firm and recorded a number of features entirely at odds with the prescriptions 
of the decision theory then current. The principal finding was that, when decisions are 
made in conditions of high uncertainty - conditions, that is, poorly structured in terms of 
knowledge, beliefs, information - their outcomes are not easily assessed. This activates a 
search process intended to frame all the elements involved in the decision. 
A dichotomy between types of decision consequently arises, in relation to the different 
level to which the problems involved are cognitively structured : 
"Decisions in organizations vary widely with respect to the extent to which 
the decision-malung process is programmed. At one ememe we have repetitive, 
well defined problems (e.g., qualih control or production lot-size problems) 
involving tangible considerations . to which the economic models that call for 
findng the best among a set of preestablished alternatives can be applied rather 
literally. In contrast to these lughly programmed and usually rather detailed 
decisions are problems of non-repetitive sort , often invoicing basic long-range 
questions about the whole strategy of the firm or some part if it, arising initially in 
a highly unstructured form and requiring a great deal of the lunds of search 
processes listed above." (Qert. Simon and Trow, 1956, p.238) 
What are the features of decisions taken in a highly programmed decision context? 
Many field observations of human behaviour in organizations show that in well- 
structured conditions, where subjects must implement sequences of choices vis-a-vis 
alternatives well known to them, their behaviour becomes routinized. The sequence of 
choices confronted by individuals performing an organizational task constitutes a 
repetitive proced~lre which is memorized, becomes familiar to those executing it, and 
presents well-defined alternatives codified according to the variants arising from 
changing external circumstances. Most human activity within economic organizations 
takes the form of this procedural and routinized behaviour. 
If individuals are able to memorize repeated sequences of decisions deriving from their 
interactions with others, and then execute at least parts of them "automatically", the role 
of routines becomes clear: they enable individuals to save on "rational computation" and 
radically reduce the complexity of individual decisions. This narrowly restricts the area 
in which substantive rationality needs to be exercised, and therefore reduces decision 
"errors". 
It must be emphasized that this role of routinized behaviour within the decision process 
- in order to reduce the need for rational computation - is only a working hypothesis, 
and must be analyzed carehlly in order to understand its consequences and to find 
empirical evidence for it. An effort to explore more precisely how routinized behaviour 
reduces the need for "rational computation" has been made by Nelson and Winter, on 
the basis of the methodological principles enunciated by M. Polanyi in Persorlal 
Kjlolc~ledge (1958). They note that some behavioural sequences consist of actions which 
are often partially inarticulate, i.e. they are not expressed linguistically, and need not to 
be transmitted in the form of messages. This feature leads Nelson and Winter to the 
problem of how tacit knowledge is formed, transferred and stored in memory. This is an 
interesting starting point for exploring how cognitive skills, which arise though 
experience and cooperation, are stored in memory and by consequence become building 
blocks for subjects who have to solve problems. Along this line of research, Cohen and 
Bacdayan (1991) suggest that routines are stored as procedural memory; following 
Squire's (1 987) distinction between procedural and declarative memory they claim that " 
procedtrrd memory appears to be the form that stores the components of individual 
skilled actions - for both motor and cognitive skills. It is distinguished fiom declarative 
memory, which provides the storage of facts, propositions, and events." (1991, p. 5). 
They use a laboratory experiment to analyze the emergence of procedural behaviour by 
two subjects involved in a game which requires coordination and cooperation, and its 
"sedimentation" in memory. I will return later to the specific issues raised by their article 
, because the present paper is based on a replication of their experiment. The general 
point at issue here is how the acquisition and memorization of cognitive skills takes 
place, and how its transfer is possible, i.e. how skills can be re-used. Unfortunately, as 
Singley and Anderson show (1 989), the range of transfer of procedurally encoded skills 
seems to be very restricted; as the two authors demonstrate, the progress in this domain 
have been very limited and further progress is required before we can adequately 
understand the phenomenon. It is clear that any future success along this direction will 
progressively shed light on the unsolved aspects of the process of skills acquisition and 
the creation of new routines. 
My purpose here is to explore some of the features of human problem solving, skills 
creation and the emergence of routines by conducting carefbl analysis of the results 
yielded by replication of Cohen and Bacdayan's experiment. 
To clarify the question , let us fiame the problem of skills creation in relation to 
decision making processes. When a decision is highly unstructured, we are in the 
situation that Cyert and Simon called non-programmed decisions, where the 
predominant role is played by the search for the knowledge required to solve a problem. 
In this situation, not only must subjects gather information, they must also be able to 
select the information and knowledge that is effectively relevant to their purposes and to 
assimilate it into the system of knowledge that they already possess. To do so, they must 
have a "level of competence" adequate to the situation of choice; they must, that is, 
implement skills of learning and problem solving. The core of the decision-making 
process is therefore the activity of search and learning that fbrnishes actors with the 
information and knowledge they require to achieve their goals. 
The conditions for standard choice theory to be applied are entirely lacking, because 
the preferences orderings are highly incomplete, decisions are intertemporally 
inconsistent and choices are largely ineffective effective in relation to the goals to be 
pursued. The most important part of the process is driven by the ability of the subjects to 
formulate and solve problems. The problem is how to model these kind of situation. 
One way of tackling the problem is based on the idea that the solution to a task can be 
found by recursively decomposing it into a set of simpler interrelated tasks. This idea, 
now widely used in the problem solving theoretical domain, originates fiom March and 
Simon's book "Organizations" (1958). To better understand its origin, let us distinguish 
between two different aspects of routines: on the one hand, there is the aspect that I have 
emphasized above, i.e. their relationship to the cognitive structures and decision 
processes of individuals ; on the other, routines can be regarded as elementary units 
which form the basic structures internal to organizations. 
Within the organization, we can consider as rotrtille any procedure which provides for 
the execution of a specific task; it is therefore a procedure which solves a set of problems 
internal to the organization. A procedure can be described as a set of instructions 
determining the actions to be taken when dealing with a particular circumstance. 
It seems natural, therefore, to model a procedure as a program, in the specific sense 
given to the term by computation theory, as a list of instructions in an artificial language. 
This enables us to represent procedures formally and to model procedural rationality 
(March and Simon, 1958, ch. 6). 
Of course, if we try to describe the functioning of an organization as governed by a 
hierarchy of procedures, we cannot attribute to individuals the ability to memorize, 
routinize and execute them with precision: if we assume that individuals behave like 
automata endowed with unlimited memory, we fall into an. error similar to that 
committed by the proponents of "Olympian" rationality when they attribute to economic 
agents unlimited computational skills. 
In reality, individuals do not usually possess precise and detailed knowledge of 
organizational procedures; they have "incomplete" knowledge, and they are able to 
complete it by recreati~lg its missing components. 
The last observation sums up the central problem of the present paper: how can one to 
explain the ability of individuals to create procedures or recreate missing parts of it while 
they are coordinating their skills and intellectual efforts to achieve a given goal .2 
As I have said, an important approach used in the cognitive sciences adopts the idea 
that individuals solve problems by decomposing them into a set of interrelated sub- 
problems. The methodological status of this approach is twofold: on the one hand, the 
approach originates from empirical observation of real hrrma~l behaviours; on the other, 
it is the outcome of careful analysis of the nature ofproblems (mainly in games and other 
formalized contexts) and therefore is normative in character. As usual, the normative and 
descriptive aspects of this approach cannot be separated: the models based on the 
decomposition of problems - like Laird, Newell and Rosembloom's (1987) Soar - do not 
pretend to be accurate replications of the deep psychological mechanisms behind 
human behaviour; they merely seek to replicate human behaviours or at least successfully 
to compete with them. By consequence, an implicit "as if' hypothesis is presupposed by 
this approach. It is my purpose to try to reduce the domain of validity of the "as if' 
hypothesis and to verifjr - by means of laboratory experiments - to what extent the 
problem decomposition approach can be considered as providing a good explanation of 
human learning process, at least in playing games. 
I will examine how individuals learn to identify the sub-goals, to link them to each 
other, and to build "production" rules and procedures for solving elementary sub-gods. 
On this basis I will explore the emergence of behavioural rules - which involve 
cooperation - and their relationship with routinized behaviours. 
One of the most interesting results which emerge from the experiments is this: if a 
problem to be solved has a variety of different aspects, as happens in card games when 
there is a large number of different initial configurations, the learning process dominates 
-- - - -  
l ~ h e s e  two abilities are quite different the one from the other: the first one concerns the design and planning 
ability, while the second one concerns adaptation and learning. The combination of the two activities suggest to 
describe the organizational evolution as a "punctuated equilibria" process, with discontinuities: the planner . or a 
hierarchy of planners, suddendly modify the organizational structure, and the employees adapt the "informal" 
organization to the new plans; while the idea of organizational learning as the result of the interaction 
(coordination) among local forces driving the local solution of problems, leads to a daninian vision of the 
organization, chachterized by a continuous process of internal evolution. 
the actors' activity. To achieve their goals, players make sequences of  moves which 
depend on the configurations of the game; these sequences are organizational routines, 
which cannot be memorized by players because of their variety and number. Players do 
rlot keep all knowledge and information they need to play stored in memory: they create 
and memorize a set of simple "meta rules" 3 which allow them to generate the 
organizational routines . These rules are elementary "production rules" (in the standard 
sense of cognitive sciences), which are the result of sub-goals identification and allow 
players to recreate the missing knowledge at any particular moment. 
Tl,e experiment design does not allow to verify if players are aware of tile meta-rules they use, and 
consequentlv if these rules can be considered as racir ones. 
2 The Micltael's game 
The game described here was first devised by Michael Cohen and Paul Bacdayan for 
the experimental study of the development of behavioural routines in a cooperative 
context. It is a card game in which two players must cooperate in order to achieve a pre- 
established goal. A fixed payoff is awarded to each pair of players when the tournament 
is finished. This payoff is the greater the more rapidly the players complete their games, 
and it is awarded to the pair, not to the individual, so that both players have an incentive 
to cooperate. 
The game is played on the computer rather than with cards. The players move the 
cards they see on the computer screen using the mouse. The two players' moves and all 
the movements of the mouse are recorded, thus providing a detailed information base on 
the games. A tournament of 40 games involving 32 pairs of players was organized and 
recorded, replicating the original tournament by Cohen and Bacdayan. I give below the 
rules of the game as described by the two authors. 
The game is played by two players using six cards: the 2,; and 4 of a red suit, and the 
2,3 and 4 of a black suit. The players are called respectively Numberkeeper and 
Colorkeeper. When the cards are dealt, each player can see only : the card in his hand, 
the card on the target and the card in "Up" position, The board is illustrated in Fig. 1. 
Colorkeeper cannot see the card thatNumberkeeper has in his hand and vice versa. 
Fig. 1 The Mchael's game board 
Down C 4 v  2V Colorkeeper 
UP 2 4  t.* Target 
Down N 3 v  4* Numberkeeper 
What Colorkeeper can see: 
Down C ## 2v Colorkeeper 
UP 2 4  3* Target 
Down N ## ## Numberkeeper 
What Numberkeeper can see: 
Down C ## ## Colorkeeper 
UP 2 4  3* Tarset 
Down N ## 4* Numberkeeper 
In each hand that is played, the ultimate object is to put the red two into area marked 
"Target". A move in the game is an exchange of the card in a player's hand with one of 
the cards on the board (or a "Pass", making it the other player's turn). 
Each player is subject to a restriction on moves: Colorkeeper may make exchanges 
with the target area only if the colour in the target is preserved. Numberkeeper may 
exchange with the target only if the action preserves the number in the target area. 
Exchanges with board areas other than the target are not restricted. (Cohen and 
Bacdayan, 199 1). Colorkeeper moves first. 
Summarizing, during the game a player can make one of the following moves: 
U - exchange his card with the card Up 
C - exchange his card with the face-down card on the left 
of C k's card 
N - exchange his card with the face-down card on the left 
of Nk's card 
T - exchange his card with Target 
P - pass 
A state of the game is defined by the distribution of the cards on the board. Players 
do not have full and direct information about the current state of the game, because there 
are covered cards. Their knowledge of the situation is incomplete, and they must 
conjecture what state of the game is going on. The more the game proceeds, the wider is 
the information collected by players (if they use information in an intelligent way ). 
Each of the 32 pairs of players played the tournament using the same distribution of 
cards as all the others. Figure 2 shows the sequence of the games played by the 32 pairs 
with an initial configuration of 4H 2H 2C 3H 4C (nH here denotes card n of Hearts, and 
mC denotes card m of Clubs). This sequence represents the initial board of the game 
according to the following convention: the cards placed on the board are treated as the 
elements of a matrix with 3 rows and two columns B(i,j), (i=l. .2, j=1..3). Fig. 2.1 gives 
an example. 
Fig. 2.1 
1 v  2 v  
1H 2H 2C 3C 3H 1 C  = 211 3* 
3 v  411 
Fig. 2.2 The sequence of the games played by the 32 pairs of players starting from the 
above configuration 4H 2H 2C 3C 3H 1C (experimental data) 
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UNnmT 
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m 
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m 
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m 
p c m  
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m 
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PCPNUTUPT 
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For a given initial distribution of cards, each player has a wide set of possible strategies 
at his disposal. To find a strategy (and if it exists the best one) a player can follow the 
standard von Neumann-Morghenstern procedure: he can build the game tree by applying 
in order all the rules to the possible initial states. 
However, whereas in the case of (perfect) information games like chess where the initial 
state is known to both players, so that a tree of strategies can be constructed right from 
the unique initial state, in this game the initial state is unknown to the two players. At the 
starting configuration of a hand, each of the two players ignores the 3 covered cards : 
each player must therefore deduce the 6 possible configurations that may occur 
(counting the disposition of the three unknown cards in the three covered positions, we 
have 6 possible configurations). 
At the beginning of the game neither of the players knows which of the six possible 
configurations is the 'real' one. This they can only discover by acquiring further 
information as they play their hand. For every initial board each player should therefore 
prepare a strategy. This manner of proceeding obviously would require a memory and a 
computing capacity which far exceeds normal non-specialized human capacities. These 
are the typical conditions of computational complexity which highlight the relevance of 
the assumption of bounded rationality . 
Moreover, the experiment shows that individuals do not proceed in the manner 
suggested by the classic model of Olympian rationality. The players are unable to use all 
the information available, and in many cases they are not able to memorize all of it. 
This depends on the constraints imposed by two types of memory - i.e. the ability to 
process a little information instantaneously, and the ability to process a lot of information 
but only through storage in the long-term memory - which make it impossible to adopt a 
plan which incorporates all 6 possible configurations (Cohen and Bacdayan 1991). The 
experimental data (see below) confirm the fact that the players do not use all the 
available information. This is because they cannot memorize all of it simultaneously, and 
because they do not conduct a thorough search of all the rules space. 
If each player is unable to memorize all the configurations and to discover the best 
strategy available, which kind of search process can he activate to find a (good) strategy? 
The classic analysis of the process of strategic search - Nilsson (1980), Pearl (1984), 
Newel1 (1990) - is based on the idea that to each state of the tree can be assigned an 
evaluator which enables the player to choose among the different local strategies which 
appear (locally) optimal. The problem with this approach is that the evaluators are 
supposed to be "given" exogenously; there is no method by which the evaluators can be 
generated endogenously. 
A different approach is based on the idea that I discussed in the Introduction, namely 
that the solution to a task can be found by decomposing it into a set of simpler 
interrelated tasks. 
As we shall prove experimentally, players do not normally explore all the possible 
strategies, but move on the space of strategies and sub-strategies, solving local problems 
and using them as building blocks with which to solve further problems. 
We shall see that the search in the space of sub-problems is a highly uncertain and 
conjectural process. In fact when a problem has been decomposed into a set of sub- 
problems, generally not all of the sub-problems will be immediately solvable. The main 
goal - at this stage of the exploration - is to understand the relations among sub- 
problems. During their attempts to understand the connections among problems, players 
do not focus their attention immediately on the existence of procedures which allow the 
sub-problems to be solved. The problem space is explored in the sense that new sub- 
problems and new connections among the sub-problems are discovered; the aim being to 
reduce recursively complex problems to simpler ones and to understand their reciprocal 
relationships. This exploration, however, does not require that the solutions of the 
'simpler' problems should be known. 
3 The space of the srrb-goals 
Let us see how the space of the sub-problems for the game described above (henceforth 
Michael's Game) can be constructed. As I have said, the problem is to put 2V in the 
Target. At the beginning of the card game any other card may be in the Target. 
Reasoning 'backwards' and using the rules of the game, one finds that 2V can be put 
into the Target area only if (Fig. 3): 
1. 3 v or 4~ is in the Target and the player with 2 v in his hand is the Colorkeeper; 
2. 24, is in the target and the player with 2v in his hand is the Numberkeeper. 
Fig. 3 
3 v ------ > 2 v Numberkeeper 
2& ------ > 2 v Colorkeeper 
4 v ------> 2 v Numberkeeper 
The problem can therefore be solved if at the beginning of the game one of the three 
cards 4 ~ ,  3 V, 24, is in the Target area. Let us instead suppose that one of the remaining 
cards, i.e. 3&, or 44, is in the Target. In this case, the game can be solved if we are able 
to reduce it to the situation above, i.e. to put one of the cards 4v ,  3 V ,  2 2  in the Target. 
Applying the rules we see that this is effectively possible, and by reasoning backwards as 
before we obtain the following relations: 
Fig. 4 
34, ------ > 3 v Numberkeeper 
44, ------ > 4 v Numberkeeper 
34, ------ > 24, Colorkeeper 
4& ------> 24, Colorkeeper 
4& -------> 3 4, Colorkeeper 
We have therefore decomposed the problem into its sub-goals. Of course, this is only 
one of the possible decomposition's that could be performed, and takes account only of 
the situation in the Target. As we shall see fiom experimental examination of the 
sequences, there are good grounds for considering it of particular importance. 
If we combine these relations among sub-goals we obtain the graph given in Fig. 5 
Fig. 5 The graph of sub-goals. 
4 * ---------------- 4 v  
I \  1 3 4  -------- 1  I  3 v  I 
1 1  
2* --------------- 
\ I 
2 v  
Colorkeeper 's legal moves - - - 
Numberkeeper's legal moves --------- 
The nodes of the graph represent the cards that can be in the Target position of the 
game board. The nodes adjacent to a given node indicate the cards that can be placed by 
Nk or by Ck on the Target to replace the card currently on it. For example, if 4 4  is in 
the Target area, the rules allow its exchange with 4 ~ ,  with 3* or with 2 1 .  If we 
concentrate only what happens on the Target during the game, we find that the sequence 
of cards follows the connections in figure 1. 
Of course, the rules state that certain moves can only be made by Nk and others only 
by Ck. The graph is arranged so that all the horizontal lines represent permissible moves 
by the Numberkeeper brrt rfot by the Colorkeeper. Conversely, all the vertical and 
oblique lines represent moves that Ck is permitted to make but Nk is not. 
It is possible to reconstruct the sequences of cards in the Target during a game. This 
can be done by following the paths in the graph which begin with the card that was on 
the Target at the beginning and finish with the card on the Target at the end. For 
example, if the initial card in the Target was 4 1  and the final card is 2 v ,  then we have 
the following paths on the graph: 
Fig. 6 Paths and Hamiitonians in the sub-goals space 
1 - 4* 4 v  2 v  
2  - 4* 2 4  2 v  
3  - 4* 3 4  3 v  2 v  
4  - 4 4  3* 2 4  2 v  
5 - 4 4  3* 3 v  4 v  2 v  
6 - 4 4  3& 3~ 4~ 4 4  2 4  2~ 
7 - 4* ... .................................. 
The graph therefore represents the space of the sub-goals that the players may - klly 
or partially - figure out in order to solve the game: Different paths represent different 
decompositions of the final goal into partial goals. 
One notes immediately that the first 5 paths pass only once through a given node. Every 
longer path passes more than once through at least one node. In case 6 above, for 
instance, the path passes twice through node 4 a .  
The situation that arises when 4 a  is on the Target is of particular interest for its 
complexity, and I shall therefore use it as an example. In Fig. 6 the paths in the graph 
which begin with 4.1. are ordered according to the (increasing) number of nodes that are 
passed through. Paths 1 and 2 are equivalent because they both comprise three nodes, 
while all the others contain a larger number of nodes. It is usually possible to find the 
minimal path (or paths) connecting two nodes in the graph, and in our case it is indeed a 
trivial undertaking: they are the two paths 4 a  2 a  2 v  and 4 a  4 v  2 v ,  which are 
therefore optimal. 
The final goal of putting 2 V  into the Target can be achieved with one move if the 
card on the Target at the beginning of the game is 3 V,  2 4  or 4 V .  These are the cards 
adjacent to node 2~ in the graph. In all other cases intermediate goals must be 
accomplished before the final goal is achieved. 
4 Coiljectzrral strategies 
The graph of the sub-goals introduced above can be used to formulate the following 
working hypothesis: the players do not learn and memorize a game strategy which 
enables them to behave optimally. Instead, they learn and memorize the graph of sub- 
goals, or a part of it, and then use it to devise their own game strategy. Since a strategy 
must enable a player to decide the move to be made at every stage of the game, the 
problem is whether there exists a concise way of representing the strategy, or whether 
the player must remember the entire tree of moves of which it is composed. Only if there 
exists a set of rules which are sufficiently short and simple to be memorized by the player 
can we assume that he is able to learn it and use it. 
In Michael's game this compact set of simple rules exists, and it derives from the 
conjectural decomposition of the problems space. The players generate a fraction of 
strategy at each stage of the game on the basis of whichever sub-goal is important at the 
time. I would stress that this is a coiljrctlrral search (Egidi 1991) by pointing out that 
the existence of a given path in the graph indicates that the problem admits to a solution, 
but that it does not coi~structivrly provide a solution. The players realize that the 
problem can be solved, i.e. that there is a procedure which if adopted by them will lead 
to the desired outcome, but they do not know what this procedure is. 
For example, suppose that the card initially on the Target is 4 a .  In this case one 
solution is the sequence 4.t. 2& 2 V  , and it is reached as follows: Ck puts Z& on the 
Target and Nk puts 2~ on the Target. 2 a  and 2 v  are the 'key-cards' in this sequence. If 
the players have them in their hands, they can immediately execute the sequence, 
otherwise they will have to search for the key-cards and then lay them on the Target. 
Because the two players can always find the two hidden cards, a solution certainly exists. 
Accordingly, a solution to the problem exists, but we have not yet specified it in 
detail. We know that a sequence of key-cards can be put on the Target in order to 
achieve the goal. But we do not know exactly what sequence of moves Ck and Nk must 
perform. This manner of proceeding is entirely different from strategy identification in 
traditional game theory. In the latter case, in fact, to identify a strategy it is necessary to 
construct the game tree, and therefore to construct the sequences that lead to the desired 
outcome, but this is not necessary in the scheme analysed here. 
A simple analogy shows that this is an issue with a general bearing on learning and 
discovery processes. Consider the discovery of theorems in a formalized theory. On the 
one hand, we have theorems of pure existence, which show that the problem is capable 
of solution. On the other, there are cot~strz~ctiw theorems which indicate how to find the 
solution; i.e. ones derived from an algorithm (or procedure) which leads to the solution. 
The experimental results discussed below show that this distinction is reflected in the 
behaviour of the two players, since for the majority of players it is much easier to explore 
the space of the sub-problems and find the correct paths than it is to identify the 
procedures required to accomplish these paths. 
Once both players have identified a path in the graph, i.e. a sequence of key-cards that 
must be put on the Target, the problem is that they cannot communicate to each other 
which path they want to follow. Each player can understand which path the other intends 
to pursue only by observing the moves that his partner makes. If there is only one 
optimal path, as happens for example when there is a hearts card on the Target (see Fig. 
5 ) ,  the interaction between the two players is very simple, and coordination can 
straightfonvardly take place because each player has only one task to perform. If there 
are two optimal paths, as happens when the 3 or 4  of clubs is on the Target, the players 
may find coordination extremely difficult, given that the information that each of them 
obtains from watching the first moves of the other is normally not enough to deduce 
which path has been chosen. 
In this case, the goals that the two players set themselves may be incompatible, and 
the game will require an adjustment of goals after a certain number of moves. This 
therefore raises a first kind of coordination problem: the coordination of goals. 
In the case in which the two players' goals are compatible - that is, both of them have 
chosen to follow the same path in the graph - in order to implement their strategy they 
must acquire the key-card for that path. To do this, they must conduct a search that can 
proceed in many different ways, both because of the distribution of the cards and because 
of the different forms that cooperation between the two players can take. Here a second 
form of coordination takes place : the coordination of procedures. 
In order to examine the features of the two kinds of coordination, we must first clarify 
how a player decides the move to make . As an example, assume that at the beginning of 
a hand the card on the target is 4 6 .  If players are able to signal to each other that they 
want to follow the path 4 6  2 6  ZV, their actions will be the following: 
Ck looks for 2 6  and, if he has 2 ~  in his hand. he reveals it to Nk. When he finds 24,  he 
keeps it in his hand and puts it in the target. 
If Nk has 2 6  in his hand, he reveals it to Ck. He then looks for 2v  and, when he finds 
it, he keeps it in his hand, and waits until Ck puts 2 6  in the target . He finally puts 2 0  
in the target. 
Of course the problem is how the players can signal to each other the sub-goal they 
wish to pursue. Before discussing this crucial point, let us generalize the example above. 
If we extend the analysis to the other minimal paths in the graph, we obtain the following 
table 
Fig. 7 
Conjectural Card on Target NumberKeeper's ColorKeeperls 
Strategy at the sub-strategy sub-strategy 
beginning 
1 3 v  Reveal 2v  Seek 2v  
2 4v  Reveal 2v Seek 2v  
3 2, Seek 2v  Reveal 2~ 
4 3, Seek 3v  Reveal 3 v Goto 1 
5 3, Reveal 2, Seek 2, Goto 3 
6 4 4  Seek 4v  Reveal 4v  Goto 2 
7 4, Reveal 2, Seek 2 4  Goto 3 
Seek X means: look for card X and put it into the Target area. 
Reveal X means: put card X on Up so that your partner can use it. 
J 
We have thus identified the strategies that the players must adopt on the basis' of 
minimal paths for each of the possible initial situations of the Target. Fig. 7 requires 
some comment. The original task (putting the 2v into the Target) has been divided into 
independent tasks each of which must be completed by a different player. 
To understand better how players may coordinate themselves, it is convenient to 
classify the hands into two orders of difficulty, in relation to the different "distances" 
between the card on the target at the beginning of the hand and the final position (2 v on 
the Target). This distance is easily measured in terns of the number of sub-goals which 
compose the problem to be solved: looking at the graph of sub-goals (Fig. 5) and 
counting the number of branches which connect the 2v with the card in the Target at the 
beginning , gives us the number of the sub-goals . 
In cases 1, 2, 3 in Fig. 7 there is only one branch connecting 2v  with the card in the 
Target. I classify this kind of hand as being at a "low" level of difficulty; in cases 4,5,6,7 
(Fig. 7) there are two branches connecting 2~ with the card in the Target, and I will 
consider hands of this kind as being at a "high" level of difficulty. 
There are good reasons for this classification. In the case of configurations with a low 
level of difficulty, in fact, in order to achieve their goal the players must perform actions 
which require a very elementary kind of goal coordination, one which does rrot require 
signalling. One of the players - the action leader - must search for the key-card and place 
it in the Target. The role of the other player is simply to reveal the key-card if he has it in 
his hand. Consequently, if the players have a clear idea of their elementary goal, they can 
accomplish it without any hrther information. In the opposite case of hands with a high 
level of difficulty, the players must choose between two different paths (at least), and 
therefore each player must understand the sub-task chosen by his partner in order to 
move consistently with him . 
To coordinate their tasks, the players must use the information arising from the board 
regarding the status of the cards and eventually the moves which have been made. Let 
us see how the board status and the moves can be considered as a signalling system 
which enables the players to coordinate their goals. 
Note that in hands with a high level of difficulty (cases 4, 5, 6, 7 in Fig. 7) the 
sequences of actions to perform have been divided into two stages according to the two 
sub-goals pursued. For example, suppose that the card initially in the Target is 4 v  and 
that the players adopt strategy n. 7. This strategy consists of a first phase in which Nk 
must search for 4 v .  When Nk has placed 4 v  in the Target, Ck must search for 2 v  (the 
second phase of the strategy) in order to put it in the Target. 
In each of these two phases there is a "'Leader" player who must search for a key- 
card, and a "follower" who must reveal to him that card if he has it. The follower may 
even help the leader in his search, and if this happens the problem arises of coordinating 
the search for the key-card. Involved here is procedztral coordi?zation, which only 
appears when it is clear to both players which key-card they must search for. As we shall 
see below, the helping behaviour of the follower is usually inefficient: the more effective 
course of action, in fact, is one in which the follower only reveals the key-card if he has 
it in his hand, instead of trying to help the leader in his search. 
To return to our example, if during the first phase the follower does not have the 
leader's key-card ( 4 ~ )  in his hand, instead of waiting until the leader finds 4 v  and puts it 
in the Target he can immediately start searching for his own key-card, the 2 of Hearts. In 
this way the second phase is anticipated and performed in parallel with the first, since the 
two players search sintztltaneowly for their key-card: the Colorkeeper for 2 v  and the 
Numberkeeper for 4 v . 
This obviously raises a serious problem of sub-goal coordination: how, in fact, can 
the two players know the card that the other is searching for? Since they cannot signal 
their intentions, they can only act according to the information yielded by the board, that 
is, on the moves that have been made. The question is this: is the information rich 
enough to allow players to understand unambiguously each other's intention and 
therefore to coordinate their action? 
1 will discuss this crucial point in paragraph 8, while in the following paragraph I will 
go deeper into the distinction between procedural coordination and sub-task 
coordination. 
6 Co~ljectrtral strategies a??dprocedlrral .. coordiuation. 
Let us return to the analysis of the nature of the strategies listed in Fig. 7. Each strategy 
can be realized by executing a set of rules, like "Search for 2 v" or "Reveal 44".  
I shall call 'conjectural strategy' the set of rules which, if followed by the player, lead to 
completion of the task. 
Note that these are not strategies in the traditional sense of the term until the generic 
terms 'Seek' and 'Reveal' are transformed into precise procedrrres. At this stage, we can 
be sure that the game can be successfully played because we know that the players can 
always successfully conduct their search for the key-cards, even if we do not know the 
procedures which allow the effective sequence of moves to be made. This is why I have 
used the term 'conjectural': a conjecture must be made in order to assume that the 
procedures which solve the elementary problems (e.g. 'Seek' 2 v )  exist and are viable. 
To take the final step and transform conjectural strategies into a true procedure (i.e. 
with a set of rules which state unequivocally the moves that the players must make at 
every moment of the game), the procedures corresponding to 'Seek' and 'Reveal' must be 
hlly specified. This can be done in many different ways as regards the 'Seek' procedure, 
depending on how the two players decide to coordinate their actions during the search. 
It is obvious that every conjectural strategy identifies a single path. But the relation 
does not hold in reverse: to each path, in fact, there usually corresponds several 
strategies. 
Let us assume that, in order to implement a strategy, the two players decide to 
acquire the key-cards of that particular path. To do this, they must conduct a search 
which can take different forms - both because of the arrangement of the cards and 
because of the different ways in which cooperation between the two players can take 
place. 
The problem is therefore to discover the relations between each path and the possible 
solutions it leads to; that is, the strategies which, if adopted by the two players, enable 
them to follow the desired path. 
The difference between the path and the strategy that realizes it can also be viewed in 
procedural terms. In fact, the existence of a specific path in the graph shows that the 
problem admits a solution, but it does not constructively provide one. The players realize 
that the problem can be solved, i.e. that there is a procedure which if adopted by them 
will lead to the desired outcome, but they do not know the procedure(s). 
On the basis of this observation we can distinguish between substantive coordination 
and procedural coordination. Substantive coordination is coordination which derives 
from choosing consistent paths. Procedural coordination derives from jointly devising or 
discovering a procedure with which plans can be implemented . 
Obviously the substantive coordination problem takes very different forms depending 
on the card in Target. In the first three cases in the above table 7, each player has only 
one possible strategy (optimal or satisficing) available. Hence the substantive 
coordination can take place as long as each of the two players is aware of the (only) 
strategy available to the other. The most interesting cases are those in which 3 1  or 4 1  is 
in the Target area, because the two players have two entirely different strategies available 
to them. This raises the problem of understanding which of the two strategies the other 
player intends to use, and therefore of coordinating their actions . 
The problem of procedural coordination arises instead in all cases, whatever the card 
in the Target area may be . It admits to different solutions depending on how the two 
players intend to interact. In fact, what do "Reveal" and "Seek" mean? 
'Reveal' may assume slightly different meanings. It is given a 'minimalist' interpretation 
when a player has a card in his hand which the other is looking for, and which he must 
reveal by putting in position U (if he does not have the card in his hand he 'passes', and 
the other player must perform the search). A stronger interpretation is when a player 
realizes what card his partner is looking for and seeks it himself in order to reveal the 
card to him when he has found it. This stronger version entails a procedural coordination 
problem in the search. The two players may hinder each other if they are both 
simultaneously seeking the same card. The same holds for the meaning of "Seek" : 
players can adopt a procedure (UUPT) which involves joint information or a procedure 
(PCPN) which allows one player only to gather information.-' 
Note that if the players move into the graph of goals while they search for a path 
connecting the goal ( 2 ~ )  with the card in the Target ( 4 1  for example) , if they discover 
the two minimal paths 414V2V and 4 1 2 1 2 v ,  they find the two optimal solutions not 
See Cohen and Bacdayan ( I99 I) .  
as a consequence of an exhaustive search in the graph, but because these two solutions 
are "easier" to discover. The discovery of the minimal path is therefore not the 
consequence of choice optimally performed, as the traditional rational choice model 
suggests: as we will see below, players do not try to make an exhaustive search in the 
space of the possible procedures before choosing: more "practically" they identifjl the 
minimum path simply by making the minimum effort during their exploration. In this 
kind of game, in fact, the shortest path between the goal and the card in the target is also 
the easiest to discover. 
7 f ie  enlergetice of meta-routines 
The main point I want to clarifjl at this stage of the analysis is whether players, after an 
initial period of learning, behave in a routinized way. We need therefore to define what 
the routinized behaviour is expected to be in this specific context, and then 
experimentally check if it emerges from players' actions. 
A first possible routinized behaviour would consist in a fixed choice of one only among 
the different possible paths connecting two nodes in the graph of sub-goals. If players 
discover only a part of the graph of subgoals, they can be tempted to use only this subset 
. More specifically, we must check if players discover one only of the two alternative 
conjectural strategies which can be chosen in order to put 2 v  on the target when the 
hand is of a high level of difficulty (34 or 4 4  on target). 
If we observe only the sequence of cards which appear on the target during a hand, we 
see sequences 444V2V and 4 4 2 4 2 ~ ,  (the two minimal paths) , or more complex ones , 
like 4 4 3 4 3 ~ 2 ~  . To be brief, hereafter I shall call respectively 442 and 422 the two 
minimal paths 444V2V and 4 4 2 4 2 ~ .  Analogously, I shall use 332 and 322 instead of 
3 4 3 ~ 2 ~  and 3 4 2 4 2 ~ .  (Fig. 8) 
Fig. 8 
4 4 4 ~ 2 ~ = > 4 4 2  44242V=>422 343v2v=>332 3&2&2~=>322 
44343v2v=>4332 4&4v3v2v=>4432 
Suppose that the card initially on the Target is 4 4 .  In this case the two minimal paths 
are 422 and 442, and the key-cards are 4v,  24,  2v .  Note that, whatever path is 
followed by the players to reach the final goal, only Colorkeeper can make use of 2 4  and 
only Numberkeeper can use 4V, while 2V can be utilized by both the players. The same 
holds if 3 4  is initially on the Target. Therefore it is convenient to call 4 v  or 3 v  "the 
key-card of Numberkeeper" , to call 2 4  "the key-card of Colorkeeper" , and finally to 
call 2 v  the "double key-card". 
Assume that during the first hands the players progressively learn to identifjl some of 
the different sub-goals and the elementary relations which link them together. In other 
words, assume that they discover a part (at least) of the sub-goals space represented in 
Fig. 5. Suppose for example that they become progressively aware of one of the paths 
connecting 4 4  with 2v  , the 442 path. We can say that they behave in a routinized way 
if, after discovery of path 442, they decide to stick to this solution for every hand starting 
I am indebted to Ricardo Pereira for this useful distinction. 
with 4 clubs on the target. (the same holds for hands starting with 3 of clubs and path 
332). 
If the great majority of players behaved as if they were routinized , we might observe a 
large number of couples following either the 442 or the 422 path, and a small number of 
players choosing the two optimal paths indifferently. 
Fig. 9 sets out the empirical results. On the horizontal axis we have the times that the 
path 442 has been chosen (the total number of hands where either 442 or 422 strategy 
can be applied is 15). On the vertical axis we have the number of couples who have 
played a given mixed path. It is clear that the players who followed one path only are a 
minority (they are represented on the two extreme sides of the statistical distribution) 
while the great majority adopt the 442 path about 50% of times, and 422 the remaining 
50%. 
The conclusion is striking: most of the players do not react in a routinized way to the 
situations that arise when the 3 or 4 of clubs is on the Target, in the sense that they do 
not use the s i e  set of rules, to reach the goal whatever the initial configuration of card 
is on the board : they do not use only one of the two alternative conjectural strategies 
that can be activated; they use both, depending on the hrther information arising from 
the board. There is a normal distribution around a central type which is characterized by 
a choice for about 50% of  times of path 442 and for 50% of path 422. This is a very 
flexible behaviour in term of goals achievement. To adopt this kind of behaviour, 
individuals must understand how the space of the sub-problems is structured. At the two 
extremes of the statistical distribution lie extremely routinized behaviours, in the sense of 
the rigid choice of one path only (either 442 or 422). Players who adopt this behaviour 
are subject to a high number of procedural errors , a greater number of errors 
compared with "flexible" players .The same occurs for 332. 
Fig. 9 -The 442 strategy's distr~bution 
1 2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5  
n of timer that 442 strategy has been played 
This phenomenon can be explained by the difficulty which arises fiom the attempt to 
apply the same set of rules (442,332 or 422,322) to every kind of cognitive and 
informative situation: in fact, not all of the initial card distributions give rise to the same 
amount of information for the players, and they therefore represent very different 
cognitive situations . This cognitive difficulty is clearly illustrated by the great difference 
in the number of players who choose 442,332 (or the complementary 422,322) strategy 
across hands. This number changes radically, as Fig. 10 and 11 show. 
Fig. 10 Path Path 
Hand N 442 and 332 422 and 322 I 
Fig. 11 
Number of "442" and "332' paths per hand 
30 T R 
In order to explain the variety of behaviours exhibited across hands, we must 
understand how the information arising from the game can determine the moves of the 
players, and more generally the choice of a path in the sub-goals space. 
For simplicity I define as static i~lformatio~l that which derives from the board status, 
and as dy~larnic i)lforniation that which derives from the partner's (present or possibly 
past) moves. 
Looking at the starting coniigurations of the 40 hands, we can select the ones in which 
one only key-card appears . In this way we have "pure" coniigurations, which show us 
the reactions of the players more clearly. The 40 initial configurations of the tournament 
are reported on the Appendix. 
These configurations can be classified as follows: 
1. Colorkeeper has his key-card (2&) in his hand : hands 3, 6, 28 
2. Colorkeeper's key-card (2&) is in the Up position : hands 14, 33, 34. 
3. Colorkeeper has the double key-card (2v) in his hand : hands 4, 23, 29. 
4. The double key-card ( 2 ~ )  is in the Up position : hands 1, 26 
5. Colorkeeper has the Numberkeeper's key-card ( 4 ~  or 3 v )  in his hand: hand 35 
It is easy to verifir (Fig. 10, Fig. 11) that within each of the four groups in cases 1, 2, 3, 
5 , the players behave in a very regular manner: the majority of the players choose the 
422 path in cases 1. 2. 5 and the majority choose the 442 in case 3. Accordingly, in Fig. 
1 1 to the cases 1.2,5 correspond a minimum, and to case 3 a maximum. 
Take case 1 as an example. Here 95% of the players follow the 422 path (the number of 
players who choose the complementary path 442 corresponds to a minimum point in the 
graph of Fig. 1 1 )  . Note that in this case corresponding to the 422 path is always the 
same first move of Ck ( to put his key-card on the Target) . In this "pure" case , the 
first move is closely correlated with the path on the graph; this suggests that we should 
see whether this property is more general, i.e. if in the pure cases there is an univocal 
correspondence between the status of the board and the move chosen by the players. 
Fig. 12 below gives the experimental result of the 5 "pure" cases. 
Fig. 12 
1 If Ck has his key card (22) in hand then his goal is to put it the Target ; the path 
that players follow is 422 (95% ) 
2 If the key-card of Ck (24) is in the Up position then his move is to pick it up and 
the path that players follow is 422 (94%) 
3 If Ck has the double key card ( 2 ~ )  in his hand then his goal is to pass until Nk has 
put his key card ( 4 ~ )  on the target . The path that the players follow is 442 
(80% ) 
4 If the double key-card ( 2 ~ )  is in the Up position then Ck's goal is either to pick it 
up (50% and the path followed is 442) or to search (50% and the path 
followed is 422) for his key card. 
5 If Ck has the partner' key card (4v) in his hand, then his goal is to search for his 
key-card 97% (and the path followed is 422) 
On the basis of Fig. 12 we may try to associate either a move or a set of alternative 
moves for Ck with each of the 5 pure configurations (and obviously to do the same for 
Nk). Fig. 13 below sets out the mapping configurations-moves based on the empirical 
data. 
Fig. 13 - Mapping between the space of pure configurations and the space of 
moves (experimental data) 
1 If Ck has his key card ( 2 s )  in his hand then his move is T ( put it in the Target) 
2 If the key-card of Ck (22) is in the Up position then his move is U (Ck picks it up) 
3 If Ck has the double key card ( 2 ~ )  in his hand then his move is P 
4 If the double key-card ( 2 ~ )  is in the Up position then the Ck's goal is either U 
(he picks it up) or C,N (search) 
5 If Ck has the partner's key card (4v) in hand, then his move is C,N (search) 
Note that some of the above rules, like rule n 3 and 5, are very "naive". In particular, 
contrary to expectations, the players seem unable to recognize configurations like 5 in 
Fig. 13, where the obvious move to make is U (Ck reveals the card he has in hand to 
his partner) . The same cognitive difficulty arises with hands of low level ( i.e. starting 
with 3, 4 of hearts or 2 of clubs on the Target) when one of the players must reveal to 
the other the key card he has in hand. As we will see below, a learning process arises, 
and very slowly the players became aware of the need to reveal the key-card of their 
partner . 
If we look the remaining hands, where none of the starting configurations is "pure", it is 
evident that more than one of the rules in Fig. 13 can be applied: a possible conflict 
among rules emerges, and therefore players must explore the space of the combinations 
among rules and decide what move to make for every "mixed" combination. 
In fact consider as an example a configuration in which Ck has the double key-card in 
his hand and his key card is in Up position (hands 2,7,27) : two rules (n 2 and 3) which 
prescribe two different moves (U and P respectively) are simultaneously activated. Fig. 
14 below shows all the mixed configurations, and the corresponding hands. 
Fig. 14 - The Space of mixed configurations 
Ck has in Hand There is in Up Hands choice of path 
442 (Fig. 1 I) 
1 - his Key-card The Double Key card 24,39 Min 
2 -  ~l The partner's key card 36 Min 
3 - the Double Key card His Key card 2,7,27 about 50% 
4 -  ~l the partner's Key card 4,13,29 Max 
5 - the partner's Key card the Double Key-card 20,25,37 Max (trend) I 
6 -  " his Key card 9,22 Max 
In order to solve the conflicts among the different prescriptions arising from the 
simultaneous application of two rules, and in order to allow players univocally to decide 
a move for every board configuration, the players may mentally explore the mixed 
configurations space. To cover exhaustively any possible configuration of key-card, their 
mental exploration would require great cognitive and memory effort. 
As we will see, there is evidence that generally the players do not explore all the rules 
combinations i l l  aLhrancr. On the contrary they realize the existence of conflicts and 
ambiguities only during the game, when they directly experiment with the mixed 
configurations . This behaviour is evidenced - as is clear from Fig. 14 - by the fact that 
the reactions of the players to the same configuration chanse over time in relation to the 
progress of the learning process. 
In cases 4 and 5 of Fig. 14 , in particular, the players modifjr their reaction to the 
configurations very slowly: they have noticeable cognitive difficulty in focusing their 
attention on the role of the partner key-card and therefore in realizing that it is 
convenient to "Reveal" to the partner his key card. 
Summing up, there is a clear evidence that players map between the key configurations 
of the game and the moves in such a way as to decide precisely the move to make for 
every key-configuration. Up to this point, however, the mapping between configurations 
and moves is not perfectly univocal, because players modifir their reactions to the key 
configurations (pure and mixed) very slowly. The question is whether this process 
converges or not on a set of rules which define univocally the move to make for every 
key-configuration. In order to answer this question we need a model of a boundedly 
rational player; an artificial player which can display all the possible "rational" solutions. 
This is the task of the nekT section. 
8 All Art~ficial Player 
How can we build "rational" strategies, and assume them as the cornerstone for 
evaluating the human strategies which emerge from the empirical data? For answer to 
this point we must build a model of procedurally rational action, generate rational 
strategies and compare them with the experimental data. As will become clear, not only 
is rationality involved in the construction of the model, but also expectations and rational 
expectations. 
To build an artificial player, we simply use the set of rules of Michael's game and 
assume that the artificial player has been able to explore the space of the rules in such a 
way as to create the graph of goals. Therefore the artificial player is based only on the 
division of goals into sub-goals that we have already discussed in detail. His behaviour 
will be described by a set of "production rules", i.e. rules of the form "If <condition> 
then <action>" , which are typical of problem solving and machine learning . 
As before, I will discuss only the configurations which are "difficult" because they admit 
more than one solution on the graph of subgoals. If a player is supposed to be able to 
explore the sub-goals graph, he must be able to choose a path in the graph. We assume 
he is able to choose the minimal path, reminding the reader of the previous caveat 
concerning the difference between the choice of a minimal path and the traditional 
optimal choice of a strategy . When there are two minimal paths the problem is which of 
the two possible paths to choose. Is the information available from the cards disposition 
on the board sufficient to decide a "rational" move univocally? 
Remember that static rrrles are those arising from application of the decomposition of 
goals to the information deriving only from the board status. The static rules impose a 
set of restrictions on the possible actions of the players. 
A model based on these rules describes players as reacting only to information provided 
by the board: players try to apply the set of static rules on the basis of information 
available fiom the cards on the board, and if a rule matches the information, they will 
move accordingly. Fig. 15 and 16 below shows the set of static rules which arise from 
the choice between the two possible minimal paths . They have been built simply by using 
the graph of sub-goals in the extended form (Fig. 7) . 
I Fig. 15 - Static rules for Nk (X, in Target, X=3,4) 
S-Rule1 - If I have my key-card (XV) in hand then my goal is either to put it in 
the Target (with probability p=AA[l] ( 442) ) or to search for 2 v  
(422) with probability l-AA[1] 
S-Rule2- If my key-card XV is on the Up position then my goal is either to pick up 
XV (with probability p=AA[2] ( 442) ) or to search for 2 v  (422) 
with probability= 1 -AA[2] 
S-Rule3- If the double key-card 2V is in my hand then my goal is either to wait until 
my partner puts his key card 2 4  in the Target (with probability 
p=AA[3] (422) ) or to search for XV (442) with probability l-AA[3] 
S-Rule4- If the double key-card 2v  is in the Up position then my goal is either to 
take it (with probability p=AA[4] ( 422) or to search for my key-card 
XV (442) with probability p= 1 -AA[4] 
I Fig. 16 Static rules for Ck (X* in Target, X=3,4) I I 
S-Rule5 If I have my key-card 2* in my hand then my goal is either to put 
it in the Target (with probability p=AA[5] ( 422) ) or to search 
for the double key-card 2 v (442) with probability=l -AA[5] 
S-Rule 6- If my key-card 2 4  is in the Up position then my goal is either to pick 
it up (with probability p=AA[6] ( 422) ) or to search for the 
double key-card 2 V (442) with probability=l -AA[6] 
S-Rule7-If the double key-card 2V is in my hand then my goal is either to Pass 
until my partner puts his key-card XV in the Target (with 
probability p=AA[7] (422) ) or to search for my key-card 2* 
(442) with probability1 -AA[7] 
S-Rule8- If the double key-card 2V is in the Up position then my goal is either 
to pick it up and Pass until my partner has put XV on the 
Target, (with probability p=AA[8] ( 422) ) or to search for my 
key-card 2 4  (442) with probability=l-AA[8] 
Note that the Nk's rules are perfectly equivalent to the Ck's ones6 
Of course these rules do not make a correspondence between pure configuration and 
moves: to any pure configuration there correspond a couple of possible moves, 
depending on the path that has been chosen on the sub-goals graph. 
The above S-rules, if applied, do not uniquely determine a move; they simply reduce the 
number of possible alternative moves. If we want to build an artificial player which 
adopts only static rules, we must then fkrther restrict the set of possible actions which 
stem from the application of a given rule. The restrictions must be applied in such a way 
that only one move is generated by a rule. One way of doing this is to set the 
probabilities AA[i] to 0 or 1 values only. Let us therefore assign to probabilities AA[i] 
only the values 0 or 1. 
Three different situations can arise: 
1 - one rule only matches the information provided by the board. 
2 - more than one rule can be applied : a possible conflict among rules emerges. 
3 - no rule matches the information on the board; information is not sufficient to 
decide the move to make. 
In the first case a rule can be applied, and consequently a goal is univocally established. 
The second case has a set of consequences which must be discussed in depth. I 
therefore anticipate discussion of the second case, which is simpler. 
In this case, the set of static rules does not allow players to decide a move for a given 
card configuration. We cannot hope to solve this situation by adding a set of dynamic 
rules , for the simple reason that dynamic rules , being based on the partner' moves, can 
be applied only after the first move of any hand. Consequently, if none of the key cards 
is "visible" at the start of a hand, we cannot use either static or dynamic rules. 
For simplicity I have drlihratc.lv onlitted Ule rule regarding Ule liiove Uiat Ck lllust use when he llas Ule Mr's 
keycard in hand (and \lcevrrsa) : it is obviously the move U (Reveal). 
This situation is temporary : if we focus our attention , as usual, on the most "difficult" 
hands, which start with 3 or 4 clubs on Target, we realize that there are three key-cards, 
so that at least one of the two players must have a key-card in his control (either one of 
them has a key-card in his hand, or a key card is in position U and therefore both players 
can see it). Therefore only one of the players at most suffers from a temporary lack of 
information: but even if the situation is "temporary", the player does not have a rule for 
deciding his goal. To solve this point, I simply assume that players, in the absence of any 
information, will search for a key-card. By consequence I add a new rule (search) which 
covers any card situation which previously did not match the static information. This 
assumption is largely confirmed by the experimental data. 
Now let us turn to the second case, when more than one rule can be simultaneously 
applied to the board. Here a conflict arises. The conflict must be resolved by providing a 
specific new rule which decides the priority among the conflicting rules. But how is it 
possible to select a new rule which allow players to move in a coordinated way? Note 
that if players behaved on the basis of the static rules only, they would not be able to 
coordinate their goals. The only way to solve the conflict is therefore to use additional 
information from the game: this means that , since the board configurations are 
insufficient for a coordinated set of actions, (rational) players must use the information 
arising from past configurations and their partner's moves. 
To clarify this point, consider the vector AA of probabilities distribution under the 
assumption that AA[i] can only be 0 or 1, depending on the goal that the players want to 
pursue. 
AA[ 1]= 1 means: If Nk has 4~ in his hand then his goal is to put 4v in the Target. 
His move is T and the expected path on graph is (442) 
AA[2]=1 means: If 4V is in the Up position then Nk's goal is to pick up 4~ . His 
move is therefore U and the expected path on the graph is (442) 
... and so on. 
Having attributed to AA[i] a value 0 or 1 for all the arguments from 1 to 8, we have 
hlly defined a one-to-one mapping between rules and moves. This implicitly defines the 
features of coordination between the two players. 
Distribution AA = (1 100-001 1) represents a 442 path and distribution AA = (001 1- 
1100) represents a 422 expected path. Any different distribution implies a non- 
coordiilated sequence of choices. In fact, for example, for the distribution (1 100- 1 100) 
Nk's goal is 4 V,  and Ck's goal is 24 ,  which are incompatible. 
As an example, Fig. 17 below shows the different behaviours which arise from different 
011 probability distributions. Note that if the two players follow a couple of goals which 
are inconsistent, as in the (1 100-1 100) distribution, they may simultaneously be self- 
consistent: in fact, in our context, the self-consistency of a player consists in the ability to 
pursue a given goal in a coherent way . In the (1 11 1-0000) distribution, the two players 
are inconsistent with themselves. Therefore two possible kinds of behaviour arise: the 
player's consistency with himself and with his partner. It is important to note that is 
possible to identify the player's consistency by analyzing the game's sequences, as shown 
in the table below. 
Fig. 17 
Hand n l l  2 1 3 v 4 V 4 1 3 1 2 v  
Nk's Ck's Play 
Goal Goal 
Consistent 
Consistent 
2V 2 4  cpl-r 
NPCPTT 
Inconsistent 
2 4  4 v  NUCTUPT 
CUTUPT 
2V 2~ NPCPPP.. 
CPNPCP.. 
Paths Nk's C k's 
rules rules 
1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8  
442 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1  
442 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1  
I have shown before that the great majority of couples do not follow the same fixed 
path for all different hands. We therefore can identify only a very small number of 
couples as characterized by a given , fixed distribution of 0- 1 probabilities. 
This means that the couples which follow - for example - the 442 path in hand n. 11, 
and are characterized by the sequence of static rules 1100-001 1, will not follow the same 
sequence for all remaining hands. Players (slowly) learn to coordinate their sub-goals, 
i.e. to choose either AA = (1 100-001 1) or AA = (001 1-1 100) across hands, in relation to 
the positions of the key-cards on the board. In consequence. the path to follow on the 
goals graph is not fixed in advance but depends on the initial distribution of cards. 
The problem now is to establish whether information fiom the board is sufficient to 
allow either player to understand his partner's intention, and consequently to choose his 
moves in a coordinated and consistent way. In other words, we must see whether there 
are signals sufficient for both players to set the distribution of probabilities either to AA 
= (1 100-001 1) or to AA = (001 1-1 100) in a univocal way, avoiding the inconsistent 
distributions. 
Note that when a confi,ouration on the board is mixed, i.e. when more than one key- 
card appears simultaneously on the board, more than one rule matches the 
configuration. Here we are in the situation summarized by Fig. 14; readers can verifi that 
these situations do not restrict the choice in such a way as to permit players to make 
univocally one move. By consequence in both cases, pure and mixed configurations, 
players need additional information in order to coordinate their goals. 
The players decide the most convenient path in relation to the available information: 
since the information provided by the cards distribution on board is not sufficient to 
coordinate their goals, each player must also use information about his partner's past 
moves. 
As consequence, we must take the dynamic rules into account. These rules allow 
players to coordinate their goals as they play the hand. Fig. 18 lists a set of dynamic rules 
which simply map the key-configurationplus the past move olrto the set of moves . 
Fig. 18 Dynamic rules concerning Nk's decisions 
1 D-Rule 1 If Ck's key-card (2+) was in Up position and  Ck took it in the last 
move then Nk searches for the double key card (2v )  
D-Rule 2 If Ck's key card (2+) was in the Up position and Ck did ilor take it 
(either Ck looks for the double key card or keeps it in his 
hand) then Nk searches for his key card (4v)  
D-Rule 3 If double key card ( 2 ~ )  was in the Up position and Ck did take it 
in the last move, then Nk searches for his key card ( 4 v )  
D-Rule 4 If the double key card (2V) is in Up position and Ck did put it 
the last move , or did not take it the last move, (Ck probably is 
looking for his key-card or keeps it in his hand) then Nk takes it 
Fig. 18 sets out the Nk's dynamic rules. Likewise, we can build the dynamic rules 
concerning Ck's decisions, by simply exchanging Nk with Ck and Nk's key-card with 
Ck's key-card in the figure. 
It is very important to note that by memorizing the past moves and recursively using the 
dynamic rules, the artificial player can use all the available information, and therefore can 
be fiilly rational; moreover, if the artificial player attributes to his partner the ability to 
use all available information, he would interpret the partner's moves as rational: in this 
case, the artificial player would have ratiol~al expectariol~s . 
Even if rational expectation behaviours can be checked in a limited number of hands, 
the evidence shows that this kind of behaviour is very rare. As is clear from the data that 
I set out in the next section, the great majority of players do not use all available 
information, and they do not attribute this kind of ability to their partner . 
9 Some evidei~ce on lear~ti~rg 
The initial card distributions in the first 5 hands have been replicated , in the same order, 
in the 5 hands after the 25th of the tournament (26 to 30). We consequently have a clear 
idea of the effects of the learning process, which are given in the Fig. 13 below. The first 
left column lists the sequences of moves played by the artificial player using static and 
dynamic rules. The artificial player uses all available information but does llor assume 
rational expectations: this means that he decides the move to make by looking at the 
configurations, plus the move made by his partner, without pretending to interpret the 
partner' move as rational. 
Fig. 19 The Learning Effect after 25 Hands 
Number of Couples 32 
Artificial Hands Experimental Data 
GOALS Hand 1 Hand 26 
4H 3C 2H 4C 2C 3H 
UCPlT 
NUTT 
CUNPTT 
UNPCPTT 
1 
2 
3 
4 
10 
31,25 
Hand 2 
7 
1 
6 
8 
22 
68,75 
Hand 27 
3H 2H 2C 4C 4H 3C 
PCPNPTT 
UUTT 
PNPTT 
15 
9 
26 
81,25 
Hand 28 
% 
Hand 3 
3H 2C 4C 3C 2H 4H 
TNPT 
TCPNPT 
NCPNPNPTT 
CNNCCNPlT 
NNPCPTT 
CCNNPTT 
CNNPCPTT 
2 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
4 
12,5 
Hand 4 
12 
6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
18 
5625  
Hand 29 
2C 2H 4H 3C 3H 4C 
PNPTT 
PCPNPTT 
NNCPlT 
NNCCTCPT 
CNTCPT 
NCCNNPTT 
PNPCPCPTT 
7 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
11 
34,375 
Hand 5 
12 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
16 
50 
Hand 30 
CCTT 
3C 3H 4C 4H 2C 2H 
NUUPT 
CUUPT 
The Table requires very little comment: in fact the improvement in the players' ability is 
very clear. 
Comparing the game conduct of the same couple faced with the same distribution 
(hands 1 and 26, 2 and 27, and so on), we have hrther confirmation that the couples 
who choose a goal path for a given cards distribution at hand X (X=1,..5) do not 
maintain the same path after 25 hands, i.e. they do not routinize a specific path on the 
goals graph. 
An issue that must be raised at this point, even though I cannot discuss it in depth, is 
this: how do the static and dynamic rules of the artificial player emerge? A tentative 
answer is the following: at the beginning of the tournament players create a set of rules 
by associating a move to every pure key-configuration. They do this in a very nai'f way, 
without fblly exploring the space of the subgoals. Then slowly they are forced by the 
emergence of mixed configurations to compare the rules of thumb and to modify them. 
Static and dynamic rules are thus gradually generated by comparing the rules of the game 
against the sub-gods. The evidence from the experiment confirms this description too, 
although more experimental data and analysis is required to give a care&] description of 
this learning process. 
A second aspect of behaviour which concerns procedure formation must be 
emphasized. If for a large number of hands the card on the Target is the same, the paths 
that the player must consider to solve the problem do not change for a period of time. 
This persistence allows players to routinize, i.e. to react to the configurations by 
"automatically" deciding the move to make; they follow the sets of static and dynamic 
rules in very precise and quick way. If the sequence of hands which starts with the same 
card on the target is suddenly interrupted by a simpler distribution (for example, when 2 
Clubs occurs in the Target) the persistence of routinized behaviour prevents the players 
from reacting in a correct way , and is therefore the cause of numerous errors. This 
aspect is clearly evidenced by the reduced number of errors and deviations from 
satisficing behaviour recorded when hands are homogeneous in terms of the Target, and 
by the high increase of errors when suddenly a different , even if very easy, initial 
distribution appears on the board. 
This search relies on the ability to learn. I have attempted to use the experimental data 
which emerge from Cohen's game replication to verify some of the current assumptions 
about routines emergence and procedural rationality . 
Much has been written over the last twenty years about the experimental study and 
analytical modelling of learning processes. I can only remember three main lines of 
enquiry: the first began with the pioneering research by March and Simon (1958) and 
Newell and Simon (1976), and analyses the learning process as a search in problem 
space; the second, which originates from McCulloch and Pitts (1943), D.O. Hebb (1949) 
and von Hayek's (1952)' ideas, develops models based on neural networks; and the third 
originates with the invention of genetic algorithms by John Holland and subsequent work 
on classifier systems. 
These approaches have been very successfbl in machine learning area, but have rarely 
been compared with the empirical results on human learning by means of laboratory 
De Vries (1993) writes: "Hayek's The Senso* Order is an intriguing book. .... Hayek was an outsider. 
Therefore he did not know D.O.Hebb's Otgatrizatiotr of Belraviour ( 1  949) until the final version of his own book 
was practicnllv finished. Hebb's vision was in so inany respects similar to liis own that Hayek doubted for a while 
whether he should publish it. However, Hebb was more concerned with physiological details and less with general 
principles, which were Havek's main interest." 
studies. Even though I have focused on the approach based on the problem 
decomposition, it becomes clear, after analysis of the experimental data, that there are 
connections with the approaches based on "production rules", which I wish now to 
discuss briefly. 
To summarize some of the previous findings: the consequences of the assumptions of 
bounded and procedural rationality, if taken seriously, give rise to a model of human 
decision making which is quite different from the traditional picture of decision as 
unbounded rational choice: cognitive and memory limitations engender a process of 
search which is highly asymmetric and path dependent. Players move (conjecturally) in 
the space of sub-problems as they try to connect the local goals to each other in order to 
achieve their specific goals. Each of them focuses his attention and forms his beliefs 
differently. Thus the coordination of beliefs becomes a crucial factor in decision 
making, which requires cognition and learning. 
Each strategy can be realized by executing a set ofproduction rules, of the form "if 
Condition then Action" , where action is, for example, "Search for 2 ~ "  or "Reveal 4&". 
I have called 'conjectural strategy' the set of rules which, if followed by the player, lead 
to completion of the task. 
Note that these are not strategies in the traditional sense of the term until the generic 
terms 'Seek' and 'Reveal' are transformed into precise proced~cres. 
Players discover very slowly a set of production rules, which allow to generate 
routines. They start from generating a set of naive rules of thumb which maps key- 
configurations of the game onto moves. The simultaneous matching of this rules , that 
happens when on the board a mixed configuration appears, give rise to a process of 
learning (adaptation) which allow players to substitute conflicting rules and provide new 
rules for the ambiguous signals. The convergence speedness to a set of stable rules 
depends on the "story", i.e on the order of the sequence of boards (with different 
cognitive difficulties) . 
What is the relationship between these findings on learning at micro-behaviour level and 
the emergence of organizational routines? 
I wish to emphasize that on a micro-behaviour level, the cognitive "atoms" are the 
elementary production rules (if Condition then Action) which by adaptation to the goals 
and sub-goals give rise to sequences of action procedurally rational. These sequences are 
the organizational routines, which are uot memorized by players. Players do not need to 
keep all knowledge and information they need to play stored in memory: they only have 
to remember the cognitive "atoms" which allow to generate the organizational routines . 
This means that they are able to explore and "recreate" missing knowledge, as I have 
suggested at the beginning of the present paper. 
We therefore must recognize that the notion of organizational routine must be 
considered as a synonymous with "not completely specified procedure". This assumption 
is confirmed by field studies of the behaviour of individuals in organizations which have 
evidenced the open and incomplete nature of routines. Incompleteness gives flexibility to 
the realization of routines and facilitates their change; a flexibility made possible precisely 
by the fact that agents are able to complete procedures by means of their ability to learn 
and to solve problems. 
References 
Alchian A. A. (1951) , "Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory", Journal of 
Political economy, vol. LVII, pp. 2 1 1-22 1 
Allais M. (1953) "Le comportement de 1' hornme rationel devant le risque: Critique del 
postulats et axiomes de 1'Ecole Americaine", Econornetrica 21, pp. 503-46. 
Arrow K. J. (1971) "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention", 
in Lamberton F. (editor), "Economics of Information and Knowledge" , 
London: Penguin Books. 
Arrow K. J. (1974) The Limits of Organizations, New York: Norton. 
Arrow K. J. (1978), "The Future and the Present in Economic life", Economic Inquirv , 
n. 16, pp.157-170. 
Axelrod R. (1984) The Evolution of Coo~eration, New York: Basic Books. 
Cyert R. M., Simon H.A. e Trow D.B. (1956) "Observation of a business decision", 
Journal of Business n. 29, pp. 23 7-248. 
Cyert R. M. e March J. G. (1963) A Behavioural Theory of the Firrn, Englewood Cliffs, 
N. J. : Prentice-Hall. 
Coase R. (1937) "The Nature of the Firm" in Economica, n. 4, pp. 386-405. 
Cohen M. D. , March J. G. e Olsen J.P. (1972) "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational 
Choice", Administrative Science Quarterlv , n. 17. 
Cohen M. D. (1991) "Individual learning and organizational routine: Emerging 
connections". Oreanization Science, 2 ( I )  pp. 135- 139. 
Cohen M. D. e Bacdayan P. (1991) "Organizational Routines Are Stored as Procedural 
Memory: Evidence Form a Laboratory Study" , University of Michigan : 
mimeo. 
Cutland N. J. (1988) Computability - An Introduction to recursive hnction theory, 
Cambridge University Press : Cambridge 
De Vries R.P. (1994) "The Place of Hayek's Theory of Mind and Perception in the 
History of Philosophy and Psychology" in Birner J. and Van Zijp (editors) 
Hayek.Co-ordination and Evolution, Routledge : London. 
Dosi G. ed Egidi M. (1991) "Substantive e Procedural Uncertainty. An exploration of 
Economic Behaviours in Complex and Changing Environments" in Journal 
of Evolutionary Economics , n. 1, pp. 145- 168 
Egidi M. (1992) "Organizational Learning and the Division of Labour" , in Egidi M, 
Mams R. (editors) Economics. Bounded Rationalitv and the Cognitive 
Revolution , Aldershot: Edward Elgar Pub. Lim. 
Friedman M. (1953) Essays in positive Economics. Chicago: Chicago University Press 
Goldberg D. E. (1989) Genetic Alsorithms in Search. Optimization. and Machine 
Learning Reading (Mass), Addison-Wesley 
von Hayek F. A. (1945) "The Use of Knowledge in Society", in American Economic 
Review. 35, n.4, pp. 519-530 
von Hayek F. A. (1952) The Sensory Order , London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
von Hayek F. A. (1980) "Economics and Knowledge" in Individualism and Economic 
Order (Reprint of 1948 first printing) Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press. 
Hebb D. 0. (1 949) The Organization of Behaviour, London: Wiley. 
Hey J. D. (1 99 1) Experiments in Economics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Holland J. H. (1975) Adaptation in natural and artificial svstems. Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press. 
Holland J. H., Holyoak K, J., Nisbett R.E., Thagard P.R., (1988) Induction - Processes 
of Inference, Learning. and Discovery, Cambridge (Mass) : MIT Press 
Holyoak K. J. (1990) "Problem Solving", in Osherson N. , Smith E.E. (editors) Thinking, 
vo1.3 ,Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
Kahneman D., Tversky A. (1986) "Rational choice and the Framing of Decisions", in 
Hogart R. M. , Reder M. W. Rational choice - The Contrast between 
Economics and Psvchologv, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press. 
Laird J.E (1984) Soar User's Manual: Version 4.0, Palo Alto: Intelligent Systems 
Laboratory, Xerox Palo Alto Research Center. 
Laird J.E., Newel1 A., Rosembloom P.S. (1987) "Soar: An architecture for general 
intelligence", Artificial Intelli~ence 3 3, pp. 1-64. 
Machina M. J. (1982) ""Expected Utility" Analysis without the independence axiom." 
Econometrica , 50 pp. 277-323. 
March J. G. (1988) Decisions and Organizations, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
March J. G. e Simon H. A. (1958) Organizations, New York: John Wiley. 
McGuire C.B., e Radner R., Decision and Organization, Amsterdam: North-Holland 
McLelland J. L., Rumelhart D. E., (1988) Parallel Distributed Processing - Explorations 
in the microstructure of Cognition , Cambridge (Mass): MIT Press 
Muth J.F.(1961), "Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements" , in 
Econometrica, vol. XXIX, N. 3, pp. 3 15-335. 
Nelson R. R. and Winter S. (1974) "Neoclassical vs. Evolutionary Theories of 
Economic Growth: Critique and Prospectus", The Economic Journal n. 4 
(336) pp. 886-905. 
Nelson R. R. and Winter S. (1982), An Evolutionarv Theorv of Economic Change, 
Cambridge (Mass) :The Belknap Press of Harward University Press . 
Newell A. (1990) Unified Theories of Cognition, Cambridge (Mass): Harward University 
Press. 
Newell A. and Simon H.A. (1972) Human Problem Solvinp, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : 
Prentice Hall. 
Nilsson, N. (1 980) Principles of Artificial Intelligence , Palo Alto (Calif.) :Tioga. 
Pearl J. (1984) Heuristics, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison- Wesley 
Polanyi M. (1958) Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy, London: 
Routledge and Kegan 
Simon H. A. (1957), Models of Man, New York: Wiley. 
Simon H. A. (1963) "Problem solving machines" in International Science and 
Technolosv, 3(36), pp. 48-62 
Simon H. A.(1969), The sciences of the Artificial (Carl Taylor Compton Lectures), 
Cambridge: M. I. T. Press 
Simon H. A. (1972a), "From Substantive to Procedural Rationality" in McGuire B., 
Radner R. 
Simon H. A. (1972b), "Theories of Bounded Rationality" in McGuire B. ,Radner R. 
Simon H. A. (1  979), "Rational Decision Making in Business Organization", in American 
Economic Review, Vol LXIX, pp. 493-5 13 
Simon H.A and Newell A (1972), Human Problem Solvin~, Englewood Cliffs, N.J: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Squire L. R., (1987) Memorv and Brain, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Williamson 0 .  (1975) Markets and Hierarchies:Analysis and Antitrust Imvlications., 
New York: Free Press. 
von Wiese L. (1929) "Die Konkurrenz, vorwiegend in soziologisch-systematischer 
Betracthung" in Verhandlungen des 6. Deutschen Sozioloeentaees 
Winter S. G. (1982), "An Essay on the Theory of Production", S. H. Hyrnans (editor), 
Economics and the World Around It, Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press 
Appendix 
The forthy initial configurations of the tournement 
